False Claims Act and Procurement Fraud Archives - Page 2 of 6

DOE OIG Cites Need for Data Analytics to Combat Fraud

Last month, the Department of Energy (“DOE”) Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) issued a special report on the DOE’s use of data analytics to reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse within DOE programs. As noted in our prior post (“More Cases and Expanded Data Analytics: A Closer Look at DOJ’s FY 2023 False Claims Act Statistics”), the Department of Justice has successfully used data analytics to identify and develop fraud cases, and the DOE OIG appears poised to adopt a similar approach—despite several implementation challenges.

Citing the significant influx of funds DOE has received through recent spending bills, the OIG report emphasized a need for the DOE to adopt data analytics and data-driven management to conduct oversight—moving away from a “pay and chase” model to a predicative, proactive approach to combatting fraud. However, the OIG found that DOE generally lacks the ability to perform comprehensive and timely analytics given that relevant data is maintained in a multitude of systems across the DOE complex. Without a coordinated approach for data standards, the OIG found that DOE’s ability to monitor contract costs and manage fraud risks is likely to be hampered.

DOJ Looks to Incentivize Whistleblowers with New Pilot Program

Robyn N. Burrows ●

On March 7, 2024, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announced that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is designing and launching a pilot program to pay monetary rewards to whistleblowers who report significant corporate or financial misconduct. The pilot program, which will roll out later this year, is intended to encourage individuals to report misconduct and for companies to further invest in their internal compliance and reporting systems.

Several agencies have already established similar programs that reward whistleblowers financially, including the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). Those programs, however, are limited in scope to each agency, resulting in what Monaco referred to as a “patchwork quilt” that does not address the full range of corporate and financial misconduct. The new pilot program is intended to fill these gaps.

Key Aspects of Pilot Program

Over the next 90 days, DOJ will be engaging in a “policy sprint” to gather information, consult with stakeholders, and design the pilot program. DOJ’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (“MLARS”) will lead the development and administration of the program.

The program’s core concepts will include the following:

Award Thresholds: DOJ expects to establish a monetary threshold to focus its resources on the most significant cases. Both the SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs limit rewards to cases in which the agency orders sanctions of one million dollars or more. DOJ may end up adopting a similar threshold.
Victim Compensation: Whistleblowers will only receive payment after all victims have been compensated.
“First in the Door”: Eligibility is limited to whistleblowers who provide truthful information not already known to the government. The information cannot be in response to any government inquiry, pre-existing reporting obligation, or imminent threat of disclosure. As Monaco emphasized, “you have to tell us something we didn’t already know.”
No Criminal Involvement: Whistleblowers cannot be involved in the criminal activity itself.
No Existing Incentive Programs: The program applies only in cases where there is no existing disclosure incentive, including qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act or another federal whistleblower program.

Enforcement Priorities

Although DOJ seeks information about any violation of federal law, Monaco clarified that the government is primarily interested in:

Criminal abuses of the U.S. financial system;
Foreign corruption cases outside the SEC’s jurisdiction; and
Domestic corruption cases, especially involving illegal corporate payments to government officials.

What to Expect from the Pilot Program?

Increase in voluntary disclosures

The new whistleblower program builds on DOJ’s prior efforts to strengthen corporate enforcement by encouraging voluntary disclosures. With the new pilot program offering monetary rewards to those “first in the door,” companies assessing whether to self-report potential misconduct must consider whether a whistleblower might get to DOJ first (thereby preventing the company from reaping the benefits of a voluntary disclosure). This may encourage companies to self-report misconduct earlier and more often. As Monaco stated, “[O]ur message to whistleblowers is clear: the Department of Justice wants to hear from you. And to those considering a voluntary self-disclosure, our message is equally clear: knock on our door before we knock on yours.”

More referrals to DOJ—and potentially fewer internal whistleblower reports

With the prospect of potentially significant financial rewards, we can expect more employees to report wrongdoing directly to DOJ, rather than going through corporate whistleblower channels. Companies should therefore ensure employees are aware of and have easy access to whistleblower hotlines to encourage internal reporting.

Focus on non-public companies

One of the “gaps” DOJ seeks to fill with the whistleblower program is to target foreign corruption cases outside the jurisdiction of the SEC, which already has its own whistleblower program. Thus, DOJ is likely to focus on suspected violations by non-public corporations.

We expect more information on program details and implementation over the coming months and will follow up with further updates.

More Cases and Expanded Data Analytics: A Closer Look at DOJ’s FY 2023 False Claims Act Statistics

Dominique L. Casimir, Luke W. Meier, and Oliver E. Jury ●

The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) recently announced its statistics for False Claims Act (“FCA”) FY 2023 settlements and judgments. DOJ recovered $2.68 billion in FY 2023; as usual, the majority of these recoveries (nearly 70 percent, or $1.8B) came from the healthcare industry. DOJ continues to make use of data analytics to inform its enforcement activity.

Background

Comparing year-to-year variance in the volume of DOJ’s FCA recoveries provides only marginal utility. More telling is the rapid expansion of the non-qui tam matters opened during the past two years. In FY 2022, DOJ opened 305 non-qui tam matters, representing approximately 186 percent of its prior ten-year average (164). In FY 2023, this increase continued, with DOJ opening 500 non-qui tam matters—305 percent of the ten-year average over FY 12–21.

3 Tips to Reduce False Claims Act Exposure in the Wake of United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu, Inc.

Justin A. Chiarodo, Jennifer A. Short, Stephanie M. Harden, Samarth Barot, and Oliver E. Jury ●

2023 is shaping up to be a major year in False Claims Act (“FCA”) practice, with the Supreme Court weighing in on both FCA scienter (in SuperValu) and the reach of the government’s dismissal authority (in Polansky), and the government focusing its enforcement efforts around antitrust, cyber, and national security. We focus today on the United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu, Inc. decision, in which the Supreme Court held that a contractor’s subjective belief about its compliance at the time it submitted claims for payment is relevant to whether it had the requisite scienter for FCA liability. Much has been written on this case, with most articles exploring esoteric concepts like “scienter,” “falsity,” and the “objectively reasonable person.” But assuming—as we do—that the decision will reduce the prospect of successful early dispositive motions, what practical steps can contractors take to reduce their False Claims Act exposure and avoid litigation in the first place? We offer three suggestions.

We begin with a basic refresher on the issue presented in SuperValu. A defendant is not liable under the False Claims Act unless it “knowingly” (including acting with “reckless disregard”) submits a false claim to the government. The “knowing” scienter element—particularly around reckless disregard—can be difficult to prove in the world of complex and often ambiguous laws and regulations that govern contractors’ compliance. The federal circuits had split on the issue of whether a defendant’s subjective interpretation at the time it submitted claims for payment to the government was relevant to determining FCA “knowledge” if the defendant could later show that the underlying rule was ambiguous and its conduct (regardless of its contemporaneous understanding or belief) was consistent with an objective, reasonable interpretation of the unsettled requirement. SuperValu resolved the debate by holding that whether a defendant knowingly violated the FCA—and satisfied the scienter element—must consider the defendant’s real-time “knowledge and subjective beliefs.” United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 1391 (2023).

The Once and Future King: SCOTUS Maintains the Government May Intervene in Previously Declined FCA Matters to Seek Dismissal

Luke W. Meier and Carolyn R. Cody-Jones ●

Last Friday, June 16, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) ruled that the federal government may seek to dismiss a qui tam False Claims Act (“FCA”) suit over the relator’s objection, even where it previously declined to intervene in the case and the relator invested in moving the case forward. The 8-1 decision by the high Court firmly established the broad authority for the government to intervene in such circumstances under a Rule 41(a) “reasonableness” standard, explaining that the key reason for this is that “the government’s interest in [an FCA] suit … is the predominant one” based on the “FCA’s government-centered purposes.” United States Ex Rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., Slip. Op. No. 21–1052, at 12, 599 U.S. ____ (2023).

When an FCA suit is filed, the government has 60 days (which is typically extended) under the FCA statute to decide whether to decline or intervene in the case. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730. If declined, the relator may proceed with the litigation without the government’s support. The statute also allows the government to intervene “at a later date upon a showing of good cause.” § 3730(c)(3). As of 2022, publicly available statistics show that the government has elected to intervene only in about 40 percent of all qui tam FCA matters subject to judgment or settlement.

What Is “Knowing” under the FCA? Supreme Court to Consider Impact of Ambiguous Regulations

Jennifer A. Short, Bridget Mayer Briggs, and Tjasse L. Fritz ●

A successful False Claims Act (“FCA”) claim must show that the defendant submitted a false claim or statement “knowingly.” The “knowing” element—the scienter prong—depends on whether the defendant actually knew that the claim or statement was incorrect, or recklessly disregarded the facts or legal requirements that rendered the claim “false.” But, of course, government regulations, contract terms, and grant requirements can be incredibly complex and difficult to understand. When the ground rules are unclear, how does a company “know” that its claims for payment may be false under the FCA?

What does the FCA say about “knowing”?

The FCA defines “knowing” as (1) having “actual knowledge of the information;” (2) acting “in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information;” or (3) acting “in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). A “specific intent to defraud” is not required for liability under the FCA.

FY 2023 NDAA Muddies the Water on Whether Chinese Semiconductor Ban Will Apply to Contractors

Robyn N. Burrows ●

Last month, we wrote about a proposed amendment to the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) that would prohibit contractors from selling certain Chinese semiconductor technologies to federal agencies and from using these same covered products and services. This measure was added through Section 5949 of the NDAA.

On December 6, the House passed a compromise version of the NDAA, which appears to scale back the semiconductor ban by applying it only to federal sales of covered products and services, without also banning contractors from using them. However, the explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA suggests contractors (including their affiliates and subsidiaries) may ultimately be prohibited from using covered semiconductor technologies—which would raise a host of compliance and implementation concerns.

Compromise Version of NDAA Limits Semiconductor Ban to Federal Sales

Section 5949 bans semiconductor products and services from Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, ChangXin Memory Technologies, and Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp., plus their subsidiaries and affiliates. This ban was modeled after the supply chain restrictions from Section 889, which prohibit contractors from selling and using covered telecommunications and video surveillance equipment from five Chinese telecom companies.

Senate Majority Leader Schumer Proposes Section 889 Expansion

Robyn N. Burrows and Merle M. DeLancey, Jr. ●

On October 18, 2022, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) issued a press release signaling a potentially significant expansion of Section 889 through a proposed amendment to the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”). Schumer’s proposal is aimed at extending the telecommunications supply chain prohibitions in Section 889 to the semiconductor manufacturing industry.

Section 889 currently prohibits contractors from providing the federal government or using any products or services that incorporate “covered telecommunications equipment or services” from five Chinese telecom companies and their affiliates and subsidiaries: (1) Huawei Technologies Company, (2) ZTE Corporation, (3) Hytera Communications Corporation, (4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, and (5) Dahua Technology Company.

Schumer’s 2023 NDAA amendment would expand Section 889 by banning semiconductor products like microchips from the following three Chinese entities: (1) Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (“SMIC”), (2) ChangXin Memory Technologies (“CXMT”), and (3) Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp. (“YMTC”). Schumer noted that these companies have known links to the Chinese state security and intelligence apparatuses. The amendment is aimed at filling a gap in federal procurement restrictions that currently do not include semiconductor technology and services, creating a vulnerability for cyberattacks and data privacy. The amendment would not take effect until three years after the NDAA’s enactment, or until 2025.

Although we do not yet know whether Schumer’s amendment will be incorporated into the final NDAA bill, contractors should nevertheless begin evaluating their supply chains to identify any semiconductor products from any of the three named Chinese manufacturers. Schumer’s amendment signals a continually expansive interpretation and enforcement of Section 889, which may be reflected in the final rulemaking for Section 889. The current FAR docket anticipates a final rule in December 2022, although these deadlines continue to be moving targets.

How to Manage a Potential Whistleblower

Dominique L. Casimir, Jennifer A. Short, and Michael Joseph Montalbano ●

The federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) is one of the United States’ most effective tools to detect and prevent fraud against the Government. One reason the FCA is so effective is that it encourages the employees of an organization to come forward as claimants and receive a share of any financial recovery to the Government. Recognizing the central role of these whistleblowers in the FCA’s enforcement scheme, Congress included an anti-retaliation provision in the statute that protects them when they report suspected fraudulent conduct. Under the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision, employees, contractors, or agents can sue for damages on their own behalf if they are “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done” in connection with a reported FCA violation. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). Likewise, nearly every state also affords some degree of whistleblower protection, either statutorily or in the common law.

November 9, 2022: “Legal and DoJ Matters”

Blank Rome partner Justin A. Chiarodo will serve as a panelist at Federal Publications Seminars and Capital Edge Consulting’s 2022 Government Contract Accounting and Regulatory Update, being held November 9 and 10, 2022, in Arlington, Virginia.

Justin’s session, “Legal and DoJ Matters,” will take place Wednesday, November 9, from 8:30 to 10:00 a.m., and the panel will cover settlement and judgments from recent civil fraud and false claims, penalty assessments, and emerging issues.

For more details, visit our website.

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What does the FCA say about “knowing”?

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