Supreme Court Weighs in for a Second Time on Jurisdiction over Grant Termination Cases

Dominique L. Casimir and Sara N. Gerber ●

The Supreme Court recently ruled for the second time that federal district courts likely lack jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to hear challenges to terminations of federal grants. The first such ruling came in April of this year, when the Court granted an emergency stay in California v. Department of Education. On August 21, 2025, the Supreme Court issued another emergency stay, in NIH v. American Public Health Association, reaffirming the view that challenges to grant terminations are, in substance, breach of contract actions for money damages that belong in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act.

Since California, several lower courts have nevertheless asserted jurisdiction over grantee lawsuits seeking reinstatement of terminated grants, often distinguishing California on procedural or factual grounds. We have previously written about some of those cases (including Massachusetts v. Kennedy, which was later consolidated with NIH). Although the Supreme Court’s decision in NIH is an interim order, the jurisdictional question may now be functionally settled, particularly given Justice Gorsuch’s admonishment to lower courts that even if they “sometimes disagree with this Court’s decisions…they are never free to defy them. When this court issues a decision, it constitutes a precedent that commands respect in lower courts.” Following NIH, we expect terminated grantees will largely be forced into the Court of Federal Claims, which generally does not have authority under the Tucker Act to grant the equitable relief—reinstatement of grants—that many of them are seeking.

Continue reading “Supreme Court Weighs in for a Second Time on Jurisdiction over Grant Termination Cases”

Evaluations That Prompt Corrective Action Must Be Documented

Michael J. Slattery

We discussed in a previous blog post how the current state of the law at the U.S Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and within the Federal Circuit limits offerors’ ability to effectively challenge agency corrective action. See Is There No Balm in Gilead? The Federal Circuit’s Decision in Dell Federal Systems L.P. v. United States Reinforces Contractors’ Dwindling Options to Effectively Challenge Agency Corrective Action. Specifically, we demonstrated that GAO has adopted a highly deferential, “hands off” position with regard to agency corrective action, holding that “the details of a corrective action are within the sound discretion and judgment of the contracting agency.” Northrop Grumman Tech. Servs., Inc., B-404636.11, June 15, 2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 121 at 3. Under governing GAO case law, agencies have discretion to decide the scope of corrective action, including whether discussions will be held, the breadth of such discussions, which offerors shall be included in the corrective action, and the scope of permitted revisions to proposals. Deloitte Consulting, LLP, B-412125.6, Nov. 28, 2016, 2016 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 348 at *1, *11 (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l., B-292077.2, Sept. 4, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 157 at 5). Indeed, GAO will not disturb an agency’s proposed corrective action so long as the corrective action is deemed reasonable—that is, so long as the corrective action is “appropriate to remedy the flaw which the agency believes exists in its procurement process.” Onésimus Def., LLC, B-41123.3, B-41123.4, July 24, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 224 at 5. Continue reading “Evaluations That Prompt Corrective Action Must Be Documented”

Exit mobile version
%%footer%%