Category: Contract Performance and Administration

FAR Council Issues Final Rule on Sustainable Products & Services

Sara N. Gerber ●

As part of the Biden administration’s effort to use federal purchasing power to tackle climate change, the FAR Council issued a final rule, effective May 22, 2024, requiring agencies to procure “sustainable products and services,” to the “maximum extent practicable.” The “sustainable products and services” rule is just one of several proposed rules and directives intended to compel the government and government contractors to do business in a more environmentally sustainable way.

Under the final rule, the procurement of sustainable products and services is considered “practicable” if the products or services meet “reasonable performance requirements” and can be acquired “competitively within a reasonable performance schedule” and at “a reasonable price.” Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 23.103(a)(1). To determine whether the price is reasonable, the regulation directs agencies to “consider whether the product is cost-effective over the life of the product.” FAR 23.103(a)(2). If an agency determines that it is not practicable to procure sustainable products or services, the contracting officer must document the reason in writing in the contract file. FAR 23.103(a)(2).

Continue reading “FAR Council Issues Final Rule on Sustainable Products & Services”

OMB Issues Guidance on Application of Section 889 to Federal Assistance Recipients—and Confirms No Part B “Use” Prohibition

Robyn N. Burrows ●

On April 22, 2024, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) issued final guidance regarding the application of the Section 889 telecommunications ban to federal grants, loans, and cooperative agreements under 2 C.F.R. § 200.216. As a quick recap, Part A of Section 889 prohibits contractors from providing the federal government covered telecommunications equipment and services from certain Chinese manufacturers, whereas Part B prohibits contractors from using covered equipment and services. Section 889 also applies to grant, loan, and cooperative agreement recipients and subrecipients through 2 C.F.R. § 200.216, with certain differences. Most notably, OMB recently clarified that the Part B “use” prohibition does not apply to recipients and subrecipients, meaning they may use covered telecommunications equipment and services as long as they are not purchased with federal funds.

Continue reading “OMB Issues Guidance on Application of Section 889 to Federal Assistance Recipients—and Confirms No Part B “Use” Prohibition”

Two Sides to Every Story: When Is Extrinsic Evidence Relevant to Interpreting the Scope of a Contractor Release?

Stephanie M. Harden and David L. Bodner ●

When is it appropriate to consider “extrinsic evidence” of the parties’ intent when interpreting a contractor’s release of claims? A new decision out of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”), Sonabend Company (ASBCA No. 63359), sheds new light on this important question, denying the government’s motion for summary judgment because the release language it relied on was ambiguous and thus raised an issue of fact.

Signing Releases—An Area Fraught with Risk

Releases are typically presented to the contractor as routine. Simply sign the modification and new work scope or new funding will be added to your contract! But when a contractor signs a modification, it might waive its ability to later pursue a cost claim, even for prior changes not impacted by the modification itself. Thus, it is important to identify modification language that may bar a future claim.

The government typically seeks to bar recovery based on at least one of two legal theories: (1) a release and (2) accord and satisfaction.

  • Release—a unilateral act by which one party disclaims a contract right or obligation.
  • Accord and Satisfaction—a bilateral agreement or an accord, where the parties agree to altered performance and the acceptance of such altered performance is satisfaction of the accord, which discharges the claim.

In practice, these theories may apply even though a modification does not announce itself as a release or an accord and satisfaction or a bar to a future claim.

Continue reading “Two Sides to Every Story: When Is Extrinsic Evidence Relevant to Interpreting the Scope of a Contractor Release?”

3 Tips to Reduce False Claims Act Exposure in the Wake of United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu, Inc.

Justin A. Chiarodo, Jennifer A. Short, Stephanie M. Harden, Samarth Barot, and Oliver E. Jury ●

2023 is shaping up to be a major year in False Claims Act (“FCA”) practice, with the Supreme Court weighing in on both FCA scienter (in SuperValu) and the reach of the government’s dismissal authority (in Polansky), and the government focusing its enforcement efforts around antitrust, cyber, and national security. We focus today on the United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu, Inc. decision, in which the Supreme Court held that a contractor’s subjective belief about its compliance at the time it submitted claims for payment is relevant to whether it had the requisite scienter for FCA liability. Much has been written on this case, with most articles exploring esoteric concepts like “scienter,” “falsity,” and the “objectively reasonable person.” But assuming—as we do—that the decision will reduce the prospect of successful early dispositive motions, what practical steps can contractors take to reduce their False Claims Act exposure and avoid litigation in the first place? We offer three suggestions.

We begin with a basic refresher on the issue presented in SuperValu. A defendant is not liable under the False Claims Act unless it “knowingly” (including acting with “reckless disregard”) submits a false claim to the government. The “knowing” scienter element—particularly around reckless disregard—can be difficult to prove in the world of complex and often ambiguous laws and regulations that govern contractors’ compliance. The federal circuits had split on the issue of whether a defendant’s subjective interpretation at the time it submitted claims for payment to the government was relevant to determining FCA “knowledge” if the defendant could later show that the underlying rule was ambiguous and its conduct (regardless of its contemporaneous understanding or belief) was consistent with an objective, reasonable interpretation of the unsettled requirement. SuperValu resolved the debate by holding that whether a defendant knowingly violated the FCA—and satisfied the scienter element—must consider the defendant’s real-time “knowledge and subjective beliefs.” United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu, Inc., 143 S. Ct. 1391 (2023).

Continue reading “3 Tips to Reduce False Claims Act Exposure in the Wake of United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu, Inc.“

Conflicting State and Federal Requirements for Government Contractors . . . Again

Merle M. DeLancey, Jr. ●

In 2021, federal government prime contractors and subcontractors found themselves in a difficult situation with respect to COVID vaccination requirements. More than a dozen states enacted laws prohibiting companies from requiring their employees to be COVID-19 vaccinated or even show proof of COVID-19 vaccination as a condition of employment. At the same time, federal government contracts were subject to mandatory employee vaccination requirements in the FAR and DFARS. (i.e., FAR 52.223-99 Ensuring Adequate COVID-19 Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors (OCT 2021) (DEVIATION) and DFARS 252.223-7999 Ensuring Adequate COVID-19 Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors (Deviation 2021-O0009) (OCT 2021). Luckily, the potential conflict was resolved, on May 9, 2023, when President Biden signed Executive Order (“EO”) 14099, Moving Beyond COVID–19 Vaccination Requirements for Federal Workers, which revoked EO 14042, Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors. EO 14099 directed agencies to rescind any policies that were adopted to implement EO 14042. Thus, the potential conflict between inconsistent federal and state laws concerning COVID-19 vaccinations was mooted.

A new conflict between state and federal procurement requirements may be brewing for federal prime contractors and subcontractors concerning race-based employment preferences and diversity policies after the Supreme Court decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard and Students for Fair Admissions v. UNC.

Continue reading “Conflicting State and Federal Requirements for Government Contractors . . . Again”

Lifecycle of a Claim, Part IV: Contracting Officer’s Final Decision

Stephanie M. Harden and David L. Bodner ●


Welcome back to our “Lifecycle of a Claim” series. This series explores the Contract Disputes Act claims process, with practical guidance stemming from recent case law every step of the way. Click the subscribe button on this page to get timely updates right in your inbox!

This series walks through this infographic (click here or the image below to expand), which illustrates the lifecycle of a typical claim:

Our previous posts are available at the following hyperlinks: Part I, Part II, and Part III. This post focuses on Steps 6 through 8 of this process: reviewing the Contracting Officer’s Final Decision (“COFD”), accepting or the appealing the COFD, and resolving or litigating the matter.

We begin with these essential questions: What is a COFD? What can a contractor do if it does not like the COFD? And what is the timeline to appeal a COFD?

What Is a COFD?

A COFD is a Contracting Officer’s (“CO”) decision on the merits, which provides the reasons for the decision and notifies the contractor of its appeal rights. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(d)-(e). The FAR describes a COFD as a written decision that:

i. Describes the claim or dispute

ii. References pertinent contract terms

iii. States the factual areas of disagreement

iv. States the CO’s decision, with supporting rationale

v. includes notice of contractor’s appeal rights “substantially as follows:”

Continue reading “Lifecycle of a Claim, Part IV: Contracting Officer’s Final Decision”

And No Longer Trending: 7 FAQs Regarding the Federal Contractor TikTok Ban

Justin A. Chiarodo, Luke W. Meier, and Robyn N. Burrows ●


Building on recent and ongoing efforts to limit Chinese government access to government contractor supply chains, the FAR Councils published an interim rule effective June 2, 2023, that will broadly ban TikTok on contractor and contractor employee electronic devices used in the performance of federal contracts. The ban will be implemented through a new contract clause at FAR 52.204-27. Expect to see the clause added in all future solicitations (including commercially available off-the-shelf (“COTS”) acquisitions and micro-purchases) and added to existing contracts over the next month. We answer seven common questions on this new interim rule and offer several compliance tips.

What’s banned?

The new TikTok ban broadly prohibits contractors from having or using a “covered application” (e.g., TikTok or other successor applications by ByteDance Limited, a privately held company headquartered in Beijing, China) on any “information technology” used in the performance of a government contract. The ban applies regardless of whether the technology is owned by the government, the contractor, or the contractor’s employees. Bottom line, the rule has a (very) broad reach—it applies to contracts below the micro-purchase threshold, contracts for commercial products and services, and COTS items.

Continue reading “And No Longer Trending: 7 FAQs Regarding the Federal Contractor TikTok Ban”

Federal Contractor Vaccine Mandate to End

Merle M. DeLancey Jr. and Samarth Barot ●

Samarth Barot headshot image

After several Federal District Courts issued injunctions against the federal contractor vaccine mandate in December 2021, the Federal Government issued guidance fully suspending its enforcement of the federal contractor mandate. Despite the guidance, the future of the federal contractor vaccine mandate continued to remain in a state of limbo. This was best demonstrated two weeks ago when the Ninth Circuit sided with the Federal Government by lifting the district court’s preliminary injunction of the federal contractor vaccine mandate. The Ninth Circuit’s decision created a split with the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits that have enjoined the mandate. This Circuit split was likely headed to the United States Supreme Court.

On May 1, 2023, all of this changed. The Biden Administration announced its plan to end its federal contractor vaccine mandate on May 11, 2023, the same day the public health emergency ends. Accordingly, the Administration plans to issue an Executive Order “rescinding the vaccination requirement for federal employees and COVID-19 safety protocols for federal contractors, effective at 12:01 am on May 12, 2023.” For Federal Contractors | Safer Federal Workforce. Until then, the guidance suspending the enforcement of the federal contractor mandate remains in effect.

This should be the end of the federal contractor vaccine mandate; however, we will know more by May 11, 2023. Stay tuned for further developments.

What Is “Knowing” under the FCA? Supreme Court to Consider Impact of Ambiguous Regulations

Jennifer A. Short, Bridget Mayer Briggs, and Tjasse L. Fritz ●

Jennifer A. Short headshot image
Bridget Mayer Briggs headshot image
Tjasse L. Fritz headshot image

A successful False Claims Act (“FCA”) claim must show that the defendant submitted a false claim or statement “knowingly.” The “knowing” element—the scienter prong—depends on whether the defendant actually knew that the claim or statement was incorrect, or recklessly disregarded the facts or legal requirements that rendered the claim “false.” But, of course, government regulations, contract terms, and grant requirements can be incredibly complex and difficult to understand. When the ground rules are unclear, how does a company “know” that its claims for payment may be false under the FCA?

What does the FCA say about “knowing”?

The FCA defines “knowing” as (1) having “actual knowledge of the information;” (2) acting “in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information;” or (3) acting “in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). A “specific intent to defraud” is not required for liability under the FCA. 

Continue reading “What Is “Knowing” under the FCA? Supreme Court to Consider Impact of Ambiguous Regulations”