Tag: China

10 Key Takeaways: Biden Administration Sets the Stage for Regulation of U.S. Investments in China

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Anthony Rapa, George T. Boggs, and Alan G. Kashdan ●


President Biden recently issued an executive order (“EO”) establishing a framework to regulate certain U.S. investments with a nexus to China, taking initial steps towards what eventually could be unprecedented regulation of outbound U.S. investment. Specifically, the order directs the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) to issue regulations requiring notification of, and in some cases outright prohibition of, certain U.S. investments in Chinese and Chinese-owned companies relating to semiconductors, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence. The EO also covers investments in Hong Kong and Macau.

Concurrent with the August 9, 2023, executive order, Treasury unveiled an “Outbound Investment Program” website, along with a fact sheet and an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”).

In the months ahead, it will be critical for observers to keep apprised of Congress’s reaction to President Biden’s EO and Treasury’s ANPRM, especially among members who have been particularly involved in advancing legislation on outbound investment. Congress may yet legislate on the issue, and such legislation could differ in scope from the Biden Administration’s executive action.

This alert provides background regarding the Biden Administration’s executive action, along with 10 key takeaways.

Background

Geopolitical risk commentators have anticipated an EO relating to U.S. outbound investment for some time, based on policymakers’ stated concerns around the role of U.S. investment capital in developing sensitive technologies in China. Proposals in this context have tended to focus on the establishment of a multi-agency body (akin to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) to review outbound investment in sensitive technologies or “critical capabilities” with a nexus to certain countries of concern, including China.

To read the full client alert, please visit our website. 

And No Longer Trending: 7 FAQs Regarding the Federal Contractor TikTok Ban

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Justin A. Chiarodo, Luke W. Meier, and Robyn N. Burrows ●


Building on recent and ongoing efforts to limit Chinese government access to government contractor supply chains, the FAR Councils published an interim rule effective June 2, 2023, that will broadly ban TikTok on contractor and contractor employee electronic devices used in the performance of federal contracts. The ban will be implemented through a new contract clause at FAR 52.204-27. Expect to see the clause added in all future solicitations (including commercially available off-the-shelf (“COTS”) acquisitions and micro-purchases) and added to existing contracts over the next month. We answer seven common questions on this new interim rule and offer several compliance tips.

What’s banned?

The new TikTok ban broadly prohibits contractors from having or using a “covered application” (e.g., TikTok or other successor applications by ByteDance Limited, a privately held company headquartered in Beijing, China) on any “information technology” used in the performance of a government contract. The ban applies regardless of whether the technology is owned by the government, the contractor, or the contractor’s employees. Bottom line, the rule has a (very) broad reach—it applies to contracts below the micro-purchase threshold, contracts for commercial products and services, and COTS items.

Continue reading “And No Longer Trending: 7 FAQs Regarding the Federal Contractor TikTok Ban”

FY 2023 NDAA Muddies the Water on Whether Chinese Semiconductor Ban Will Apply to Contractors

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Robyn N. Burrows ●

Last month, we wrote about a proposed amendment to the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) that would prohibit contractors from selling certain Chinese semiconductor technologies to federal agencies and from using these same covered products and services. This measure was added through Section 5949 of the NDAA.

On December 6, the House passed a compromise version of the NDAA, which appears to scale back the semiconductor ban by applying it only to federal sales of covered products and services, without also banning contractors from using them. However, the explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA suggests contractors (including their affiliates and subsidiaries) may ultimately be prohibited from using covered semiconductor technologies—which would raise a host of compliance and implementation concerns.

Compromise Version of NDAA Limits Semiconductor Ban to Federal Sales

Section 5949 bans semiconductor products and services from Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, ChangXin Memory Technologies, and Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp., plus their subsidiaries and affiliates. This ban was modeled after the supply chain restrictions from Section 889, which prohibit contractors from selling and using covered telecommunications and video surveillance equipment from five Chinese telecom companies.

Continue reading “FY 2023 NDAA Muddies the Water on Whether Chinese Semiconductor Ban Will Apply to Contractors”

Senate Majority Leader Schumer Proposes Section 889 Expansion

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Robyn N. Burrows and Merle M. DeLancey, Jr. ●

On October 18, 2022, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) issued a press release signaling a potentially significant expansion of Section 889 through a proposed amendment to the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”). Schumer’s proposal is aimed at extending the telecommunications supply chain prohibitions in Section 889 to the semiconductor manufacturing industry.

Section 889 currently prohibits contractors from providing the federal government or using any products or services that incorporate “covered telecommunications equipment or services” from five Chinese telecom companies and their affiliates and subsidiaries: (1) Huawei Technologies Company, (2) ZTE Corporation, (3) Hytera Communications Corporation, (4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, and (5) Dahua Technology Company.

Schumer’s 2023 NDAA amendment would expand Section 889 by banning semiconductor products like microchips from the following three Chinese entities: (1) Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (“SMIC”), (2) ChangXin Memory Technologies (“CXMT”), and (3) Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp. (“YMTC”). Schumer noted that these companies have known links to the Chinese state security and intelligence apparatuses. The amendment is aimed at filling a gap in federal procurement restrictions that currently do not include semiconductor technology and services, creating a vulnerability for cyberattacks and data privacy. The amendment would not take effect until three years after the NDAA’s enactment, or until 2025.

Although we do not yet know whether Schumer’s amendment will be incorporated into the final NDAA bill, contractors should nevertheless begin evaluating their supply chains to identify any semiconductor products from any of the three named Chinese manufacturers. Schumer’s amendment signals a continually expansive interpretation and enforcement of Section 889, which may be reflected in the final rulemaking for Section 889. The current FAR docket anticipates a final rule in December 2022, although these deadlines continue to be moving targets.

New Semiconductor Export Controls: Executive Briefing

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Anthony Rapa ●

On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued sweeping new export controls under the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) aiming to cut off support for China’s advanced computing and supercomputing capabilities, with the new controls targeting specified chips, chipmaking equipment, and related services.

The BIS rule, which runs over 100 pages, is the most significant expansion of semiconductor-related export controls in recent memory, if not the history of the EAR, and marks a decisive inflection point in the U.S. strategic competition with China. Companies in the semiconductor industry should gauge their exposure to China-related risk, which could be present in oblique and non-obvious ways, and service providers to the industry should assess their risk exposure in light of the rule’s provisions regarding U.S. person “support” for restricted activities.

Continue reading “New Semiconductor Export Controls: Executive Briefing“

Westlaw Today: U.S. Commerce Department Issues Semiconductor-Related Export Controls

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Westlaw Today, October 7, 2022

Anthony Rapa and Matthew J. Thomas ●

On August 15, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule imposing new export controls relating to certain semiconductor technology.

Specifically, the rule establishes a requirement under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to obtain a license from BIS before exporting to certain destinations the following materials and technologies:

      • Substrates of gallium oxide and diamond (ultra-wide bandgap semiconductors); and
      • Electronic Computer Aided Design (ECAD) software for the development of integrated circuits with Gate All-Around Field Effect Transistor (GAAFET) structures.

The control for the specified substrates is effective Aug. 15, 2022, while the control for the ECAD/GAAFET software is effective Oct. 14, 2022, with a comment period for industry that ran through Sept. 14, 2022.

The rulemaking follows public reports in July 2022 indicating that BIS had sent letters to chipmaking equipment manufacturers directing them not to export to China equipment capable of fabricating chips at 14 nanometers and below.

You can read more on our website.

DoD Section 889 Telecommunications Prohibition Waiver Expires

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Merle M. DeLancey Jr. ●

Effective October 1, 2022, Department of Defense (“DoD”) contractors must comply with Part B of Section 889 of the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”). The approximately two-year long Part B waiver granted to the Director of National Intelligence expired October 1. DoD contractors cannot seek a DoD agency-level waiver as DoD cannot grant waivers under the statute. Thus, as with other agencies, DoD is prohibited from entering into, extending, or renewing contracts with contractors who use covered telecommunications or video surveillance equipment and services from certain Chinese companies in any part of their business.

Compliance with Part A of Section 889 was straightforward. Part A prohibited contractors from selling covered technology to the federal agencies. Comparatively, compliance with Part B is much more complicated. Part B requires a contractor to certify that it does not use “any equipment, system, or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system.” The prohibition applies to all contracts at any dollar value. “Covered telecommunications equipment or services” is defined as equipment, services and/or video surveillance products from Huawei Technologies Company, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, Hytera Communications Company, Dahua Technology Company, ZTE Corporation, or any entity controlled by the People’s Republic of China.

For more information regarding Part B compliance, see our prior posts For Part B of Section 889, Is Compliance by August 13, 2020, Realistic? and Five Steps to Take to Prepare for Part B of the Section 889 Ban.

Complying with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act’s Strict Supply Chain Rules

Anthony Rapa, Matthew J. Thomas, and Patrick F. Collins ●


The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (“UFLPA” or “Act”), which took effect last month, ushers in a new era of supply chain diligence for importers. The Act creates a rebuttable presumption that any goods produced in whole or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (“XUAR”) of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), or by entities identified by the U.S. government on the UFLPA Entity List (“Entity List”), are presumed to be made with forced labor and thus are prohibited from entry into the United States under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1307). Notably, the presumption applies to downstream products that incorporate restricted goods, regardless of where the downstream products are made.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) is now authorized to detain and exclude and/or seize goods that it suspects were produced in the XUAR or by entities on the Entity List.

Importers whose supply chains have links to the XUAR and China should be aware of the implications of UFLPA enforcement, including with respect to due diligence considerations, supply chain tracing and management, and the evidence required to overcome the UFLPA’s rebuttable presumption. There is no grace period for enforcement.

UFLPA OVERVIEW

President Biden signed the UFLPA into law on December 23, 2021. Effective on June 21, 2022, the UFLPA established a rebuttable presumption that the importation of any “goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” in the XUAR, or produced by entities designated by the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (“FLETF”) as involved in specified XUAR-related activity, is prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits the importation of items made from forced labor. The presumption applies unless CBP determines that the importer completely and substantively responded to all CBP inquiries, fully complied with FLETF’s guidance, and established by clear and convincing evidence that the goods were not produced using forced labor.

To read the full client alert, please visit our website. 

Where Are We Going with Section 889 Part B?

Justin A. Chiarodo, Merle M. DeLancey, Jr., and Robyn N. Burrows

About two months have passed since the August 13, 2020, effective date of Part B of Section 889 of the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. Part B, sometimes referred to as the Chinese telecommunications equipment ban, broadly prohibits the federal government from contracting with entities that use certain Chinese telecommunications (including video surveillance) equipment and services.

After the FAR Council published its July 10, 2020, Interim Rule, contractors, large and small, spent countless hours working to be able to certify compliance by August 13. This deadline was critical because the Interim Rule said that absent such a certification, a contractor was ineligible for future contract awards. That is, government agencies were prohibited from renewing or extending existing contracts with contractors unable to certify Part B compliance. Indeed, agencies were prohibited from issuing an order under an existing contract to a contractor that failed to certify compliance.

Yet, despite the Rule’s laudable policy goals, the government’s piecemeal and inconsistent implementation has placed government contractors in an untenable position. Continue reading “Where Are We Going with Section 889 Part B?”

A DoD New Year’s Resolution: No More Chinese (and Possibly Russian) Products and Services in Support of Key Missions

Justin A. Chiarodo and Robyn N. Burrows

A very Happy New Year to our GovCon Navigator readers! Further expanding recent supply chain restrictions across federal procurement, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) issued an interim rule prohibiting DoD from procuring equipment or services from certain Chinese entities (and possibly Russian) if used to carry out DoD nuclear deterrence or homeland defense missions. The rule builds on the Section 889 supply chain restrictions we previously covered in a prior blog post.

What should contractors do now given the interim rule is already in effect? Contractors should first evaluate their existing contract portfolios for covered missions and take immediate steps to eliminate all covered products from their supply chain (and find alternate sources of supply). If the rule might impact contract performance, you should be prepared to address this with the appropriate counterparty. And given the requirement for compliance certifications that mirror Section 889, contractors should also harmonize monitoring and compliance with their existing supply chain compliance programs. Among other things, this should address the requirement to obtain compliance certifications from downstream subcontractors and suppliers.

Read on for the specifics.

Continue reading “A DoD New Year’s Resolution: No More Chinese (and Possibly Russian) Products and Services in Support of Key Missions”

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