Tag: Ninth Circuit

Disagreeing with the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit and Two District Courts Find APA Jurisdiction in Challenges to Federal Contract and Grant Terminations

Dominique L. Casimir and Sara N. Gerber ●

One of the immediate priorities of the second Trump administration has been the termination of a slew of federal contracts and grants. This, predictably, has led to litigation, mostly filed in the U.S. District Courts, which as we have previously written, have authority to grant equitable relief. The government has been arguing that these cases belong in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, where only monetary damages are available (and only upon meeting the high burden of establishing that the government acted in bad faith). On April 4, 2025, the Supreme Court issued an emergency stay of a District Court’s preliminary injunction in a case challenging grant terminations, with the five-justice majority suggesting that the termination case belonged in the Court of Federal Claims. But since then, two U.S. District Courts and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have ruled—contrary to the Supreme Court’s emergency stay order—that there is indeed district court jurisdiction in cases challenging contract and grant terminations. As Judge Young of the District Court of Massachusetts stated, “…this Court, after careful reflection, finds itself in the somewhat awkward position of agreeing with the Supreme Court dissenters and considering itself bound by the still authoritative decision of the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit…” which ruled that the Tucker Act did not apply, and that the government’s actions were reviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).

Continue reading “Disagreeing with the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit and Two District Courts Find APA Jurisdiction in Challenges to Federal Contract and Grant Terminations”

Supreme Court Grants Cert to Resolve Circuit Split on FCA Statute of Limitations

Sara N. Gerber

The U.S. Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari to address a Circuit Court split concerning whether False Claims Act (“FCA”) relators may rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)—a limitations period which is triggered by the government’s knowledge of the fraud—when the government does not intervene. The Supreme Court granted cert on November 16, 2018, to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in U.S. ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Alabama District Court, reviving the relator’s complaint by giving the relator the benefit of the longer limitations period in § 3731(b)(2).

At the center of the matter is the interplay between the two limitations periods in the FCA after which a “civil action under section 3730” is time-barred: (1) “6 years after the date” of an alleged violation, see 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1); or (2) “3 years after the date” when material facts “are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no more than 10 years after the date” of the alleged violation, see 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2). The relator in Cochise Consultancy filed his claim more than six years after the alleged fraud occurred, but within three years of his disclosure of the fraud to FBI agents who had interviewed him about his role in a separate kickback scheme, to which he ultimately pled guilty and served time in federal prison. Continue reading “Supreme Court Grants Cert to Resolve Circuit Split on FCA Statute of Limitations”

The Ninth Circuit Reluctantly Joins Majority of Courts in Mandating Escobar’s Two-Part Test for Implied Certification

Robyn N. Burrows

Over two years ago, the Supreme Court in Universal Health Servs. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) upheld the implied certification theory of liability under the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”). Applying a two-part test, the Court stated that implied liability would attach where “at least two conditions” are satisfied: (1) the claim makes specific representations about goods or services provided and (2) the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with a material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement renders those representations “misleading half-truths.” Courts interpreting Escobar have disagreed as to whether this two-part test is the exclusive means for establishing liability under the implied certification theory, or whether other circumstances might also trigger liability. For example, several courts have noted that Escobar’s reference to “at least two conditions” implies that other, unspecified factors might also be sufficient to create an implied certification claim. The Fourth Circuit, along with several other district courts, have adopted this more liberal view. Most other circuits that have addressed this issue, however, have found the two-part test to be mandatory. The First, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, as well as many district courts, have either explicitly or implicitly held that Escobar’s two-part test is the exclusive means of establishing implied certification. Continue reading “The Ninth Circuit Reluctantly Joins Majority of Courts in Mandating Escobar’s Two-Part Test for Implied Certification”