The U.S. Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari to address a Circuit Court split concerning whether False Claims Act (“FCA”) relators may rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)—a limitations period which is triggered by the government’s knowledge of the fraud—when the government does not intervene. The Supreme Court granted cert on November 16, 2018, to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in U.S. ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Alabama District Court, reviving the relator’s complaint by giving the relator the benefit of the longer limitations period in § 3731(b)(2).
At the center of the matter is the interplay between the two limitations periods in the FCA after which a “civil action under section 3730” is time-barred: (1) “6 years after the date” of an alleged violation, see 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1); or (2) “3 years after the date” when material facts “are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no more than 10 years after the date” of the alleged violation, see 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2). The relator in Cochise Consultancy filed his claim more than six years after the alleged fraud occurred, but within three years of his disclosure of the fraud to FBI agents who had interviewed him about his role in a separate kickback scheme, to which he ultimately pled guilty and served time in federal prison. Continue reading “Supreme Court Grants Cert to Resolve Circuit Split on FCA Statute of Limitations”
Over two years ago, the Supreme Court in Universal Health Servs. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) upheld the implied certification theory of liability under the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”). Applying a two-part test, the Court stated that implied liability would attach where “at least two conditions” are satisfied: (1) the claim makes specific representations about goods or services provided and (2) the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with a material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement renders those representations “misleading half-truths.” Courts interpreting Escobar have disagreed as to whether this two-part test is the exclusive means for establishing liability under the implied certification theory, or whether other circumstances might also trigger liability. For example, several courts have noted that Escobar’s reference to “at least two conditions” implies that other, unspecified factors might also be sufficient to create an implied certification claim. The Fourth Circuit, along with several other district courts, have adopted this more liberal view. Most other circuits that have addressed this issue, however, have found the two-part test to be mandatory. The First, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, as well as many district courts, have either explicitly or implicitly held that Escobar’s two-part test is the exclusive means of establishing implied certification.